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The main contributions of this paper are: 1) With respect to the character of the token-based protocol, a switched system model is developed. Different from the traditional switched system where the number of subsystems is fixed, in our new model this number will be changed under deception attacks.
2) For this model, a new Kalman filter (KF) is developed for the purpose of attack detection and the missing data reconstruction. 3) For the given linear feedback WNCSs, when the noise level is below a threshold derived in this paper, the maximum allowable duration of deception attacks is obtained to maintain the exponential stability of the system. Finally, a numerical example based on a linearized model of an inverted pendulum is provided to ogenous control input, the whole system is modelled as a constrained control system and the maximum perturbation is given in the form of reachable set computation [27] . Under deception attacks, an intrusion detection system is designed for WNCSs to identify the existence of the attacks.
These aforementioned works are mainly focused on the design and detection of deception attacks in wireless network. However, since different topological structures are deployed in wireless network, the corresponding communication characters are different [16, 17, 20, [30] [31] [32] 37] . This paper is mainly concerned with token-based WNCSs under deception attacks. The token-based wireless network consists of many wireless nodes, where a wireless node is treated as a master station and other nodes are regarded as slave stations. The data exchange between master and slave stations is controlled by using the tokens, which may be injected with the false data, leading to the deterioration of the system performance or even system instability. Therefore, we face the following new challenges and difficulties:
1) The first challenge is how to model the closed-loop system based on the traditional switched system. The difficulty is that the switching character introduced by the token-based protocol to the closed-loop system aggravates the complexity of system modelling.
2) When deception attacks destroy the authenticity of measurement data and the integrity of the token-based industrial wireless network, how to design a new KF to detect deception attacks and reconstruct the missing data is the second challenge.
3) The third challenge is how to analyze the maximum allowable duration of deception attacks to maintain the exponential stability of the system considering the switching character of the closed-loop system. This paper investigates the stability of token-based WNCSs under deception attacks. The main contributions include: 1) An innovative switched system model is developed with the varying number of the sub-systems for deception attacks. 2) A new KF is developed for attack detection and the missing data reconstruction.
3) The maximum allowable duration of deception attacks is obtained for guaranteeing the exponential stability of the system.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the problem formulation, including the character analysis of token-based WNCSs, synergic action within deception attacks detection and control center (DADCC) as well as control objectives. The stability analysis is given in Section 3 and simulation results are provided in Section 4, followed by the conclusion in Section 5. Fig. 1 shows the structure of token-based WNCSs, where the outputs of the system are sampled by the distributed sensors and transmitted via a token-based WICN. The data transmission through wireless network may be under deception attacks, which can be detected in the DADCC by using a KF. Furthermore, according to the detection results, the missing data are compensated and the control signals are finally produced. Consider the following plant:
Problem formulation

The character analysis of token-based WNCSs
where x(k) ∈ R nx and u(k) ∈ R nu are the state vector and the control input vector;
T ∈ R N are the measurement outputs; w(k) ∈ R nx and v(k) ∈ R N are the process noise and the measurement noise with zero mean as well as covariance matrices Q ∈ R nx×nx and R ∈ R N ×N , respectively; A ∈ R nx×nx , B ∈ R nx×nu and C ∈ R N ×nx are constant matrices of appropriate dimensions.
As shown in Fig. 1 , the plant contains N outputs y i (k) (i = 1, 2, . . . , N ), which are spatially distributed [4, 14, 18] . Each output is attached to a sensor that is regarded as a slave station. At each sampling instant, the slave station can access the master station only when it holds the token. Fig. 2 shows the topological structure of the WICN, where the master station communicates with the slave station based on the token-based protocol.
Furthermore, WICN adopts Open System Interconnection (OSI) model that consists of several layers, such as Physical Layer (PL) and DLL, etc. DLL can be further divided into two sub-layers: Logical Link Control (LLC) and Media Access Control (MAC). In PL, all slave stations and the master station are designed based on IEEE 802.15.4a [23] . A traditional Carrier Sense Multiple Access/Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) protocol is used in MAC sub-layer to ensure the reliability of the data transmission. The tokenbased protocol is presented in the LLC sub-layer by two stages as follows: 1) Network generation. The master station incorporates the functioning and off-line slave stations into the token ring network. The off-line slave stations send "request network frame" to the master station. After being received, the connectivity table is constructed, as shown in Table 1 . Every slave station has its own predecessor and successor. For instance, the first row in Table 1 illustrates sensor N and sensor 2 is the predecessor and successor of sensor 1, respectively. Then the master station encapsulates the connectivity table into "connection table frame" and sends it to all slave stations in the WICN. After sending "connection table frame", the master station enters the next stage: Network operation. Once the slave station receives "connection table frame", it records the predecessor as well as successor and stops sending "request network frame". Finally, the slave stations enter the following Network operation stage.
2) Network operation. Fig. 3 shows the detailed process of network operation. After sensor i ∈ {1, . . . , N } receives the token from its predecessor (shown as 3 ⃝), it is activated. In other words, it takes a sample at the recent and right sampling instant k and transmits y i (k) to the master station (shown as 1 ⃝ and the data transmission delay is τ sm (k)). Let i * k ∈ {1, . . . , N } denote the activated sensor at the sampling instant k, after the master station receives y i * k (k) at k + τ sm (k), it immediately sends the response frame to sensor i * k (shown as 2 ⃝). Then, after sensor i * k receives the response frame, it immediately sends the token to its successor where the token arrives at k + τ sm (k) + τ ms (k) (shown as 3 ⃝ and the sum of response frame as well as the token transmission delay is τ ms (k)).
Furthermore, the successor of sensor i * k is activated at k+⌈τ sm (k) + τ ms (k)⌉, where ⌈·⌉ represents that we round · up to the integer multiple of the sampling period. In practice, the update period of the sensor is generally less than 10ms [22, 46] , and the whole time delay based on a modified IEEE 802.15.4 protocol is less than 10ms [2] . Here, we consider a typical case:
k 0 (ensuring that the memory update instants are a step slower than the sensor sampling instants in the later simulation shown as Fig.7 ). Therefore, it can be seen obviously from Next, it is necessary to demonstrate clearly the value of each element in the memory attached to the master station at the sampling instant k. If the sampling data arrives, the data in the memory is used. It is different from the buffer where the data is used until all the needed data arrives [5] . We define a
to describe all elements in the memory. After the master station receives y i * k−1 (k − 1), the corresponding element will be updated, i.e.,
Furthermore, a new quantity is introduced to express (3) as clearly as possible, i.e.,
Using (4), (3) can be re-written as 
Therefore, using (5),
where
} denotes the updated components in the memory depending on σ(k), and σ(k) is defined by
. . , N }. Remark 1. Note that, unlike Theorem 2 in [25] , the switching rule is preset as σ(k) = i * k−1 according to the token-based protocol, which can not be changed to stabilize the system. Meanwhile different from the traditional switched system, the number of sub-systems varies with deception attacks (to be discussed later).
To clearly show the data updates in the memory, Fig. 4 presents an instance of a wireless network with 4 sensors. It can be seen that at the 7 th sampling instant, sensor i * 7 = 3 just holds the token but the master station keeps y i * 6 (6) = y 2 (6). Thus, all elements in the memory are
T . Remark 2. The token-based wireless network is vulnerable in PL and DDL. For example, due to broadcast nature of the medium in PL [24, 34] , the attacker can access wireless network by breaking into the radio range of the slave stations or master station, and aims to inject the false data by distorting, relaying or replacing data packets. This destroys the authenticity of the original data.
Synergic action within DADCC
For the above token-based WICN, the data update process in the memory has been clearly analyzed. However, when wireless network is attacked, the authenticity of measurement data is destroyed. To detect deception attacks and repair the missing data, a synergic action within DADCC is conducted, as shown in Fig. 5 . The action can be divided into the following two stages:
• Before detection: the memory is updated by the data received from the master station, becomingȳ(k), and the KF produces the a priori state estimation (i.e.,x(k|k − 1)) based on the control signals (i.e., u(k − 1)) at the previous sampling instant. Both will be sent to the deception attacks detector (DAD). Then using the pre-defined method, the DAD detects deception attacks and gives the detection result ε(k).
• After detection: the memory is updated according to the detection result, becomingỹ(k), which will be sent to the KF. Then the KF produces the a posteriori state estimation (i.e.,x(k|k)) according to the detection result. The estimation will be sent to the controller to generate the control signals at the current sampling instant k.
To clearly describe the above two stages, the pre-detection and postdetection measurements stored successively in the memory are firstly denoted by different forms, i.e.,ȳ(
is updated by the measurements from master station andỹ(k − 1);ỹ(k) is updated by the detection result that decides whether the measurements from master station is used or not. Specially,ỹ(k) =ȳ(k)= ⌢ y(k) if there are no deception attacks.
Next, the actions before detection (i.e., how to obtain the pre-detection measurementsȳ(k), the a priori state estimationx(k|k−1) and the detection result ε(k)) are described as follows:
1) The pre-detection measurementsȳ(k). At the sampling instant k,
(k) and other elements are updated by the corresponding elements fromỹ(k − 1), i.e.,
Using (4), (7) can be re-written as
Thus,ȳ(k) can be expressed as
where Λ σ(k) and σ(k) are same as (6).
2) The a priori state estimationx(k|k − 1). According to the idea of the standard KF in [3] ,x(k|k − 1) is obtained bŷ
3) The detection result ε(k). Firstly, the pre-detection measurementsȳ(k) andx(k |k − 1) are used to produce the residual, i.e.,
To get the covariance of z(k), according to the standard KF, the a priori estimation error covariance, the Kalman gain and the a posteriori estimation error covariance are given by
It is obvious that P k|k−1 will converge from any initial condition [19] , and the steady-state value denoted byP = lim k→∞ P k|k−1 can be obtained by the unique positive semi-definite solution of
The residual z(k) is assumed as a white Gaussian process with zero mean and covariance H = CP C T + R. Next, the DAD can be given by
where ς ∈ Z. The DAD compares h(k) with a pre-computed threshold ϑ. Once h(k) > ϑ, a deception attack is assumed to be detected and the detection result ε(k) is set as 0. Otherwise, ε(k) is set as 1.
Furthermore, the actions after detection (i.e., how to obtain the postdetection measurementsỹ(k) and the a posteriori state estimationx(k|k)) are given as follows:
(k) holds the most recent value, i.e.,
Substituting (4) into (15), we havẽ
Then,ỹ(k) can be expressed as
where 
2) The a posteriori state estimationx(k|k). To simplify the following discussion, we assume that the KF in DADCC starts from the steady state, i.e., P k 0 |k 0 −1 =P , which leads to a steady-state KF with fixed gain [19] . Then according toỹ(k) and ε(k), the a posteriori state estimation is obtained bŷ
Remark 3. In general, if deception attacks happen, master station receives y i * k−1 (k − 1) injected with the false data so that the corresponding element inȳ(k) in (7) is discarded according to the detection result of the DAD in (14) . Then, this missing data is reconstructed to compensate the corresponding element inỹ(k) by using (15) .
According to the above discussion, a new KF is obtained as follows:
Remark 4. Compared with the traditional standard steady-state KF in [3] , the proposed new KF incorporates compensation for the discarded data and detection results to handle deception attacks. Firstly, the ideal measurements in the standard steady-state KF are replaced byỹ(k) in (20) . If there exists the discarded data inȳ(k), it is reconstructed to compensate the corresponding element inỹ(k) by using (15) . Secondly, the detection result ε(k) is incorporated into (20) . When ε(k) = 1, (20) is degenerated into the standard steady-state KF; otherwise,x(k|k) is not updated.
According tox(k |k ), a state feedback law can be designed as
Substituting (17) and (21) into (20) , it follows that
whereσ(k) is same as (17) ,
Consequently, substituting (21) and (22) into (1), we can obtain a closedloop system
. . , N + 1}, which denotes the switching function. Denote
as the switching rule, whereσ(k) = j m means that the sub-system j m locates in [s m , s m+1 ). The switching instants series {s m } is the subsequence of the sampling instants series {k}, i.e., {s m } ⊆ {k}. Remark 5. For the closed-loop system (23), the system structure firstly becomes more complex. This is because the sub-system 1, . . . , N may switch based on the token-based protocol, but an additional new sub-system N + 1 is induced under deception attacks. On the other hand, the parameters of the system are also more complex because the post-detection measurements y(k) and the detection result ε(k) are incorporated into (23) . Therefore, it is more difficult to analyze the stability of WNCSs compared with that of NCSs [38, [43] [44] [45] .
Control objectives
We are interested in how to make sure that WNCSs are robust under deception attacks. Two control objectives are considered here: one is the duration of deception attacks; another is the associated stability and system performance.
Definition 1-Sub-system Duration [35] . Considering any sampling instant k or l, and k l k 0 , Θ j (l, k) denotes the duration of the sub-system j in [l, k), where j ∈ J. Then there are κ ∈ N and θ j 1 satisfying
where Θ N +1 (l, k) can be called deception attacks duration. Moreover, the incident rate θ j of the sub-system j satisfies ∑ j∈J θ j = 1. Especially, θ N +1 is called the incident rate of deception attacks. Remark 6. The definition of sub-system duration extends that of DoS duration in [35] since the system under no deception attack is a switched system due to the token-based protocol. Further, by using (24), we can get θ N +1 according to θ i as discussed in the following Definition 3.
Inequality (24) and equation (25) can be explained in Fig. 6 . For example, to calculate the sub-system duration with 4 sensor nodes, Fig. 6 Another important point, the switching numbers have the connection with the sub-system duration.
Definition 2-Switching numbers [13] . Considering any sampling instant k or l, and k l k 0 , n(l, k) represents the switching numbers of switching signalσ(k) in [l, k). Then there are N 0 ∈ N and T ∈ R satisfying:
Lemma 1-Connection between deception attacks and switching numbers. Considering the same notation in Definitions 1 and 2, when deception attacks appear, T and the incident rate of deception attacks θ N +1 satisfy θ N +1 > 1 − 1/T (27) for all k > k 0 .
Proof. When deception attacks are absent, we have {s
Thus, it can be seen clearly that deception attacks can reduce n(l, k). Denote the reduction of
Meanwhile, deception attacks produce the sub-system N + 1. Thus, the relationship between Θ N +1 (l, k) and ∆n(l, k) can be given by
Using (24) and (26), (27) can be obtained from (28) . The proof is ended. Fig. 6 explains the inequality (27) . For instance, to calculate the duration of deception attacks and the switching numbers with 4 sensor nodes, Furthermore, the following definition is provided to prove the exponential stability of the closed-loop system. Definition 3. Consider any deception attacks sequences satisfying Definitions 1 and 2 such that
where i = 1, . . . , N . Then the system (23) is exponentially stable with a noise level index λ > 0, i.e.,
(1) For v(k) and w(k), there is
where |•| means the Euclidean norm of •.
(2) When v(k) ≡ 0 and w(k) ≡ 0, there exist c > 0 and decay rate ρ > 1 such that the solutions of the system (23) satisfy
for all k > k 0 .
Remark 7.
Referring to [11, 15, 25, 35] , Definition 3 is given for analyzing the stability of token-based WNCSs under deception attacks. It mainly contains three aspects: 1) Similar as an admissible maximum communication denial on the average in [35] , a condition of maximum allowable incident rate of deception attacks is presented. 2) Similar as the given filtering performance in [11, 15, 25] , a noise level is provided for v(k) and w(k). 3) Referring to [25] , an exponential stability condition is given when v(k) ≡ 0 and w(k) ≡ 0.
Stability analysis
The characters of the above closed-loop switched system have been analyzed, including the sub-system duration, the switching numbers and the connection between deception attacks and switching numbers. In this section, the exponential stability with a noise level index is proved and the maximum allowable duration of deception attacks is obtained to maintain the exponential stability of the system. Theorem 1. Consider the closed-loop switched system (23), if the tuning
nx×nx is the n x × n x real identity matrix, then the system is exponentially stable with decay rate ρ = µ
under the maximum allowable incident rate of deception attacks, i.e., θ
Proof. Choosing the following Lyapunov function:
To derive easily, two quantities are denoted by
The following proof is performed in two cases.
1) When
),σ(k) =σ(k + 1) = j m , which indicates that no switch occurs, it follows from (35) and (32) such that
Thus, we can derive
2) When k = s m , the sub-systemσ(k − ) = j m−1 switches to the sub-system σ(k) = j m , where j m−1 ̸ = j m ∈ J, we can derive V jm (k) from V j m−1 (k − ) by using (33) such that
Furthermore, using the above (37) and (38), we can derive V jm (k) from
To further analyze (39), the following two steps are carried out. i) Consider the second term at its right, i.e.,
To make (40) hold, we need
where q s 0 . Thus, we obtain
for k k 0 .
ii) According to (39) and (40), the first term at its right follows that
Then we further analyze the relationship between the parameters in (43) and the stability of the whole switched system. The performance of each sub-system should be discussed, i.e., 1) For each sub-system, if there are a
N +1 > 1, it means that the sub-system i is stable and the sub-system N + 1 is unstable, where i = 1, . . . , N .
2) For each switching action, there is µ > 1. This means that the switching action degrades the performance of the closed-loop system.
If the above two cases hold, we can obtain
Here, if (44) , (42) and (34) hold, it indicates that ρ = µ However, we do not always know all incident rates of sub-system i. Hence, the following corollary also presents the results for the case where all incident rates of sub-system i are unified. Corollary 1. Consider the closed-loop switched system (23), if we have the tuning parameters
. . , N , λ > 0, and the matrices P pj ∈ R nx×nx , p = 1, 2, 3, 4, j ∈ J satisfy (32) and (33), the system is exponentially stable with decay rate
N +1 under the maximum allowable incident rate of deception attacks, i.e., θ
Proof. Choosing the same Lyapunov function as (35) and using (32) and (33), we can obtain (39). Then we choose a noise level index to satisfy (40) . According to (39) and (40) , (43) is obtained. Similarly, by the analysis of the parameters in (43) and using (25), we have
Furthermore, from Lemma 1 and (47), we can obtain (45). Remark 9. The inequalities (34) and (45) both provide the upper bound, i.e., the maximum allowable incident rate θ ′ N +1 of deception attacks. However, when the sub-systems and network environment are similar, the tuning parameters a i can be set as the same values. Since ∑ j∈J θ j = 1 in (25), (34) becomes the simpler form (45) . This can be easier to calculate.
Simulation
Assume that an inverted pendulum system has four sensors for measuring its cart displacement, velocity, pendulum angle and angular velocity. The parameters of the discrete-time system model are expressed as: Deception attacks may deteriorate the system performance even cause the system instability, and so do the noises. If the covariance matrices of the noises are set as very large values, it will further accelerate the deterioration of system performance. To more clearly show how the proposed approach to handle deception attacks, the small Q and R are chosen.
The sampling period is 10ms, and the closed-loop system can be stabilized under LQR gain K = . Then, we choose the system parameters as listed in Table 2 . According to these system parameters and the controller, T ′ = 1.0714 and the maximum allowable incident rate θ where k 0 = 3. The token-based protocol is shown in Fig. 7 . Next, the attack instants and the injected false data are presented in Table 3 . The detection function is expressed as (14) , where k k 0 + 2,ς = 3. When there exist no deception attacks, h(k) is shown in Fig. 8 .
However, if there exist deception attacks, we obtain h(k) as shown in Fig.  9 . The incident rate θ 5 of deception attacks is 6.02%. This confirms the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
Conclusion
The paper has investigated the stability of token-based WNCSs under deception attacks. Firstly, with respect to the token-based protocol applied to the DLL, an innovative switched system model is developed, where the number of sub-systems will be changed under deception attacks. Then, a new KF scheme is proposed for attack detection and the missing data reconstruction. Furthermore, for the given linear feedback WNCSs, when the noise level is below a threshold derived, the maximum allowable duration of deception attacks is obtained to maintain the exponential stability of the system. Future work may involve the consideration of WNCSs under hybrid attacks and the corresponding method to cope with these hybrid attacks.
